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Abstract
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games a` la Hotelling are affected whenfirms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. Assuming a duopoly
downstream market with input price bargaining, we find that the presence of input suppliers changesthe locational incentives of downstream firms in several ways, compared with the case of exogenous
production costs. Bargaining induces downstream firms to locate further apart, despite the fact that
input prices increase with the distance between the firms. Furthermore, the downstream firm facing
the stronger input supplier has a strategic advantage and locates closer to the market centre.
D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In most models of endogenous location, interpreted either in geographical space or
product space, firms are assumed to base their choice of location on a trade-off between
capturing a larger share of the market and avoiding more intense competition. The former
consideration would induce firms to locate close to each other, whereas the latter would
point in the direction of the opposite. In the present paper we analyse a situation in which
locational choice also affects firms’ production costs. We do so by modelling a duopoly in
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which downstream firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with
upstream input suppliers. Input prices are determined in simultaneous bargaining between
each firm and its input supplier.
The existence of bilateral monopolies can be explained by the notion of asset
specificity, which potentially creates a ‘lock-in’ effect.1 Sunk investments which increase
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creates a switching cost, which decreases the value, in relative terms, of any outside
option.2 A typical example of such investments is irreversible R&D expenditures.
Another, more specific, example could be sunk marketing expenditures which create
bilateral monopoly relations between a producer of a final good (upstream firm) and a
local distributor (downstream firm).
We believe that the most obvious, and perhaps most relevant, example of bilateral
monopoly is that of a firm with a unionised labour force, where wages are determined in
bargaining between the firm and its trade union. With this interpretation, our model
corresponds to the case of decentralised, or firm-specific, wage bargaining. The present
paper is thus linked to the relatively rich literature on unionised oligopoly. Contributions to
this field which use the assumption of firm-specific wage bargaining include Horn and
Wolinsky (1988), Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989), Bughin (1999), Grandner (2001) and
Lommerud et al. (2003). It is also important to note that a bargaining model of this kind is
relevant, as Booth (1995) and others have argued, even if the labour force is not organised
in formal unions. Investments in specific human capital (‘asset specificity’), hiring and
firing costs, search frictions and legal barriers are likely to give the work force of a
particular firm some bargaining power even in the absence of unions.
Building on the classic work of Hotelling (1929), the ‘standard’ model of endogenous
location is probably D’Aspremont et al. (1979). With uniformly distributed consumers and
quadratic transportation costs they established the ‘Principle of Maximum Differentiation’:
firms will choose to locate at the endpoints of the market. In subsequent years, various
attempts to challenge this result have resulted in a sizeable body of theoretical work on this
particular subject. The most common research strategy has been to introduce stronger
centripetal forces in the model. A more concentrated consumer density,3 elastic demand4
or binding reservation prices5 are shown to yield more concentrated locations. By
introducing R&D externalities between the firms, Mai and Peng (1999) also get similar
results. Economides (1986) demonstrates that the principle of maximum differentiation
does not hold in general, but only for sufficiently convex transportation costs. Jehiel
(1992) and Friedman and Thisse (1993) show that price collusion could lead to more
concentrated locations as well. To our knowledge, though, no attempt has been made to
analyse location choices with endogenous production costs.6
1 See, e.g., Williamson (1983) and Riordan and Williamson (1985).
2 A number of empirical studies support the notion of asset specificity as explanation for vertical linkages of
this kind. See Joskow (1991) for a survey.
3 See, e.g., Neven (1986), Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Anderson and Goeree (1997).
4 See, e.g., Bo¨ckem (1994) and Rath and Zhao (2001).
5 See, e.g., Wang and Yang (1999).
6 In a very different setting, with spatial price discrimination, Gupta et al. (1994) analyse a location game in
which input prices are set by an upstream monopolist.
Our purpose is not to challenge the Principle of Maximum Differentiation. Rather, we
want to analyse how bilateral monopoly relations between upstream and downstream firms
affect the incentives for relocation in the downstream market, compared with the case in
which downstream firms buy their inputs from a competitive upstream market. The crucial
aspect of the model is the endogenisation of production costs. Since different locations will
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considerations for market shares and the degree of inter-firm competition. Firms must also
take into account how their choice of location affects production costs.7
In order to perform this analysis, we choose to apply the standard assumptions of unit
demand, uniformly distributed consumers and quadratic transportation costs. Like Lam-
bertini (1994, 1997) and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), and in contrast to D’Aspremont et al.
(1979), we do not confine the firms to choose locations within the market space. This
approach, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘unconstrained Hotelling model’, allows
us to avoid corner solutions. It is also a way to portray, albeit in a rather crude way, a
certain degree of consumer concentration in the market, which seems to be a reasonable
assumption, whether location is measured in geographical space or product space.
A priori, it is not obvious whether the endogenisation of production costs turns out to
be a centrifugal or centripetal force in the model. Since input prices are increasing in the
distance between downstream firms in our model, one would perhaps think that the firms
would locate closer in order to lower production costs through increased competition
between the input suppliers. However, the model predicts the opposite result: input
suppliers with positive bargaining power always cause the firms to locate further apart.
This apparently counter-intuitive result is due to the fact that endogenisation of production
costs changes the degree of intensity in price competition between downstream firms as a
response to relocation. A relocation in the direction of the rival firm not only reduces the
input price for the firm relocating, but also for the rival firm. This makes the centrifugal
force of inter-firm competition even stronger than in the case of exogenous production
costs. Furthermore, we find that bargaining with a strong upstream firm is a considerable
strategic advantage for downstream firms in the location game. The firm with the stronger
input supplier will always locate closer to the market centre than its competitor.
We also extend the basic model by analysing the case in which firms enter the market
sequentially. Compared with the equivalent case of exogenous production costs,8 the
presence of bilateral monopolies implies that the first-mover advantage is either reinforced
or mitigated, depending on which firm has the strategic advantage of facing the stronger
input supplier.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: after presenting the basic model in Section
2, the implications of endogenous production costs for the locational incentives of
downstream firms are analysed in Section 3. In Section 4 we extend the model to consider
the case of sequential location choice. In Section 5, some of the welfare implications of the
model are considered, and, finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
7 Mayer (2000) also assumes that production costs vary across locations. However, with the assumptions of
exogenous production costs and discriminatory pricing this paper is quite different from ours.
8 With exogenous production costs, Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) find that the first entrant will locate at the
market centre, revealing a strong first-mover advantage.
2. Model
There are two firms selling products 1 and 2 at prices p1 and p2 , respectively. The
products differ with respect to a one-dimensional characteristic, measured by xaR .
Whereas x in principle can take any real value, we assume that consumer preferences
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product’, given by zk. For simplicity, we assume that z is uniformly distributed on 0; 1½ ,
with unit mass.
Assuming unit demand, each consumer buys one unit of the good from either of the
firms. If consumer k buys the good from firm i, her utility is given by
Uki ¼ V  pi  t z k  xi
 2
; i ¼ 1; 2: ð1Þ
The third term on the right hand side of (1) reflects the disutility associated with buying a
product that differs from the consumer’s most preferred product. This ‘transportation cost’
is assumed to be a quadratic function of distance. Consumers maximise utility by choosing
to buy the good from the firm with the lower full price, i.e., mill price plus transportation
cost. The reservation price V , assumed to be equal across consumers, is sufficiently high
for the market always to be covered.
Firms produce the good using an input factor l in a constant-returns-to-scale technology,
in which one unit of l produces one unit of output. This technology is assumed to be
independent of firms’ locations.9 Inputs are supplied to the downstream firms by
independent input suppliers, with the input price wi being determined in bargaining
between firm i and its input supplier. The input suppliers’ marginal costs of production are
assumed to be equal, and are, without loss of generality, normalised to zero. Both upstream
and downstream firms are assumed to be profit maximisers. If we interpret the upstream
firms as trade unions, this would correspond to rent-maximising unions.
The profit function of firm i is given by
pi ¼ pi  wið ÞQi; ð2Þ
where Qi is the aggregate demand for firm i’s product. We can derive the aggregate demand
functions by using the following procedure: assume, without loss of generality, that x1Vx2.
When firms are located at x1px2 , let the location of the marginal consumer, who is
indifferent between buying the good from either firm, be given by zˆað0; 1Þ. For this
consumer the following equation must hold:
p1 þ t zˆ x1ð Þ2¼ p2 þ t x2  zˆð Þ2:
Solving for zˆ, we find the marginal consumer to be located at
zˆ ¼ 1
2
p2  p1
t x2  x1ð Þ þ x1 þ x2
 
: ð3Þ
9 Note that this is also an implicit assumption in standard models of location with exogenous and constant
marginal costs.
By the assumptions on the distribution of z , aggregate demand for firms 1 and 2,
respectively, are given by
Z zˆ
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0
f zð Þdz ¼ zˆ; ð4Þ
Q2 ¼
Z 1
zˆ
f zð Þdz ¼ 1 zˆ; ð5Þ
where f zð Þ is the density function. Obviously, with uniform distribution on [0, 1] and unit
mass, f zð Þ ¼ 1.
Reasonably claiming location choice to be the long-term decision of the players, we
propose the following sequence of moves in the game:
Stage 1: firms simultaneously choose their locations, x1 and x2.
Stage 2: input prices w1 and w2 are determined in simultaneous and independent
bargaining.
Stage 3: output prices p1 and p2 are simultaneously set by the downstream firms.
As usual, the model is solved by backwards induction.
2.1. Stage 3: price competition
Given the locations of the firms, x1 and x2, and the input prices, w1 and w2, the firms
simultaneously set prices to maximise profits. The first-order condition for firm i is given
by
Qi þ pi  wið Þ AQi
Azˆ
Azˆ
Api
¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2: ð6Þ
Substituting (3) and (4)–(5) into (6) and solving yields
p1 ¼ t
3
2þ x1 þ x2ð Þ x2  x1ð Þ þ 1
3
2w1 þ w2ð Þ ð7Þ
p2 ¼ t
3
4 x1  x2ð Þ x2  x1ð Þ þ 1
3
2w2 þ w1ð Þ: ð8Þ
2.2. Stage 2: bargaining
We adopt the Nash bargaining model in a simultaneous bargaining setting, where the
players in each bargaining unit negotiate over the input price assuming that an agreement
will be reached within the other bargaining unit. For simplicity, the threat points of the
bargaining parties are set equal to zero. The solution to the bargaining between firm i and
its input supplier is thus given by
wi ¼ arg max wilið Þaip1aii ; i ¼ 1; 2; ð9Þ
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firm i.
Using the anticipated equilibrium prices in the subsequent subgame, (7)–(8), and
imposing the technology li ¼ Qi, we can solve (9) to find the equilibrium input prices:
w1 ¼ a1t x2  x1ð Þ 2 2þ x1 þ x2ð Þ þ a2 4 x1  x2ð Þ
4 a1a2
 
ð10Þ
w2 ¼ a2t x2  x1ð Þ 2 4 x1  x2ð Þ þ a1 2þ x1 þ x2ð Þ
4 a1a2
 
: ð11Þ
2.3. Stage 1: location choice
At the first stage of the game, the downstream firms simultaneously choose where to
locate, each firm taking into account how its location affects input and output prices of
both firms in subsequent stages of the game. Inserting (10)–(11) into (7)–(8), and thus
eliminating input prices from the functional expressions of pi, the first-order condition for
firm i’s optimal choice of location, derived from (2), can be expressed as:
Api
Axi
 Awi
Axi
 
Qi þ pi  wið Þ AQi
Azˆ
Azˆ
Axi
þ Azˆ
Api
Api
Axi
þ Azˆ
Apj
Apj
Axi
 
¼ 0; ð12Þ
where i; j ¼ 1; 2 and ipj. Substituting from (3), (4)–(5), (7)–(8) and (10)–(11) into (12),
equilibrium locations are given by10
x1* ¼ 4þ 8a1  16a2 þ 5a1a2
4 2 a2ð Þ 2 a1ð Þ ð13Þ
x2* ¼ 20þ 8a1  16a2  a1a2
4 2 a1ð Þ 2 a2ð Þ : ð14Þ
10 The second-order conditions are satisfied, since mA2pi x1*; x2*ð Þ Ax2i ¼m 2 a1ð Þ 2 a2ð Þt 2 4 a1a2ð Þ< 0=

.
If input prices are exogenous, we know from Lambertini (1994, 1997) and Tabuchi and
Thisse (1995) that equilibrium locations are given by x1; x2ð Þ ¼  14 ; 54
 
:11 In the context
of our model, exogenous input prices would correspond to the case in which the
downstream firms have all the bargaining strength, and could be interpreted as the firms
buying inputs from a competitive upstream market, or being vertically integrated with their
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of location. From the viewpoint of firm i, by moving closer to its competitor the marginal
consumer is, ceteris paribus, pushed in the same direction, implying that the firm will gain
a larger share of the market. This is the market share effect, which is a centripetal force in
the model. The downside of moving closer to its competitor, though, is that price
competition between the firms becomes more intense. Consequently, the competition
effect is a centrifugal force in the model.
3. Location choice with input price bargaining
When input prices are endogenous, the downstream firms must take into account howthe outcome of input price bargaining is affected by the firms’ locations. In order to
analyse how this, in turn, affects the downstream firms’ location choices, it is instructivefirst to consider how changes in the relative bargaining strengths of the players provide
incentives for relocation. From (13) and (14) we can state the following comparative
statics result:
Lemma 1. An increase in the relative bargaining strength of input supplier i (input
supplier j) will give firm i an incentive to relocate towards (away from) firm j.
Proof. Taking partial derivatives in (13) – (14), we find that Ax1*Aa1 ¼
3 2 2 a1ð Þ2> 0
.
, Ax1* Aa2 ¼ 9 2 2 a1ð Þ2< 0
..
, Ax2* Aa2 ¼ 3 2 2 a2ð Þ2< 0
..
,
Ax2* Aa1 ¼ 9 2 2 a2ð Þ2> 0
..
. 5
If firm i relocates towards its rival firm, the general effect is a reduction of equilibrium
input prices. Closer location implies a more fierce competition on output prices between
the downstream firms, and there are thus less profits for the input suppliers to extract
through bargaining. In addition, tougher competition between the downstream firms
implies that input suppliers also compete more fiercely, which means that the upstream
firms will be more reluctant to push for high input prices, since total sales are more
responsive to input price differentials when price competition between downstream firms
is strong.
From the viewpoint of either firm, though, unilateral relocation has two opposing
effects. Relocation by firm i in the direction of firm j leads to a reduction in production
costs for firm i, which implies both a direct cost saving and, ceteris paribus, an improved
competitive position towards firm j . However, such a relocation also leads to reduced
production costs for firm j, which results in a more fierce price competition.
11 If the firms’ location choices are restricted to the interval 0; 1½ we would have equilibrium locations at the
endpoints, as first shown by D’Aspremont et al. (1979).
The relative strength of the two effects is determined by input price responses to
relocation, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining strength of the input
suppliers. Input suppliers would optimally want to respond to relocations by adjusting
their prices to maximise profits at all times. The extent to which they are able to do so is
determined by their relative bargaining strengths. It is thus clear that input price responses
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the viewpoint of firm i, a strong response by its own input supplier and a weak response by
the input supplier of firm j means that firm i can improve its competitive position by
relocating in the direction of its rival firm. For firm j, the incentives are opposite.
The important implication of the incentive mechanisms stated in Lemma 1 is that
bargaining with a strong input supplier is a strategic advantage for downstream firms in
the location game. To make this point more clear, consider the limit case in which only one
of the downstream firms, say firm 1, has to enter into bargain with an upstream firm. This
would correspond to the case of a2 ¼ 0.12 Now consider the relocation incentives of firm
1. By moving closer to firm 2 it can reduce its production costs without reducing the
production costs of firm 2, thus unambiguously improving its competitive position relative
to its competitor. Firm 2, on the other hand, has exact opposite incentives.
The properties of the Nash equilibrium in locations when downstream firms are locked
into bilateral monopolies with input suppliers are stated in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. (i) Firm i will locate closer to (further away from) the market centre than
firm j if ai > <ð Þaj.
(ii) The distance between the firms is increasing in ai and aj.
(iii) Equilibrium profits are equal for both firms, and increasing in ai and aj.
Proof. (i) Let Au 1
2
 x1* and Bux2* 12 be measures of the distance from the market centre
in equilibrium for firms 1 and 2, respectively. Without loss of generality, assume that
a1 > a2. From (13) and (14) we find that A B ¼ m6 a2  a1ð Þ 2 a1ð Þ 2 a2ð Þ < 0= .
(ii) Since x1Vx2 , it is sufficient to compare the partial derivatives; Ax2*=Aa1
Ax1*=Aa1 ¼ 3= 2 a1ð Þ2> 0 and Ax2*=Aa2  Ax1*=Aa2 ¼ 3= 2 a2ð Þ2> 0.
(iii) Equilibrium profits are easily calculated to be
p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 3
4
m 4 a1a2ð Þt
2 a1ð Þ 2 a2ð Þ ; ð15Þ
which yields Api=Aaj ¼ 3t=2 2 aj
 2
> 0; i; j ¼ 1; 2: 5
The first part of the Proposition, which follows naturally from Lemma 1, demonstrates
the strategic advantage of meeting a strong upstream firm in bargaining. Although the firm
facing the stronger input supplier will have higher production costs, the locational
incentives are such that this firm will locate closer to the market than its competitor,
allowing the firm to charge a higher price for its final product.
12 Alternatively, this situation could be interpreted as firm 2 being vertically integrated with its input supplier,
implying an input price equal to marginal production costs, i.e., w2 ¼ 0. It can easily be verified that this would
yield the same result.
Part (ii) of the Proposition implies that the presence of input price bargaining leads the
downstream firms to locate further apart, compared with the case of exogenous
production costs. The intuition behind this, perhaps somewhat surprising, result is strongly
linked to the discussion of Lemma 1. We know from Lemma 1 that an increase in the
relative bargaining power of one of the input suppliers provides the corresponding
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leads to a smaller distance between the firms. However, it also follows from Lemma 1 that
the optimal response of the rival firm is to relocate further away, in order credibly to soften
price competition through higher input prices. From the second part of Proposition 1 it is
apparent that this second effect always dominates, implying that the distance between the
firms is increasing in the relative bargaining strength of either input supplier.
Another interpretation of this result is that the competition effect from closer location is
stronger when input prices are endogenous, due to strategic complementarity of output
prices, and this more than offsets the gain from lower production costs. Compared with the
case of exogenous production costs, the presence of input price bargaining provides
downstream firms with incentives for raising rival’s costs by locating further away.
Furthermore, this means that, by relocating in opposite directions, the increase in output
prices, due to relaxed competition between the downstream firms, is larger than the
increase in input prices. Consequently, profits in the downstream market are higher when
the firms are faced with bargaining over input prices. An interesting implication is that
downstream firms would actually prefer having bilateral monopoly relations with input
suppliers, rather than facing a competitive upstream market, or being vertically integrated
with their respective input suppliers. The reason is that the bargaining process serves as a
credible device for softening price competition in the downstream market, yielding a
higher total profit in the market. From (15) we see that equilibrium profits are always the
same for both firms, implying that the strategic advantage of bargaining with the stronger
input supplier always exactly offsets the cost disadvantage.
Comparing with equilibrium locations for the case of exogenous production costs, it
can also be shown that firm iwill locate closer to the market centre if ai > 0 and aj ¼ 0, or
if the difference between ai and aj is sufficiently large. In the extreme case of a1 ¼ 1 and
a2 ¼ 0 ,13 it follows from (13) – (14) that equilibrium locations are given by
x1 ¼ m12 ; x2 ¼ m72
 
. This resembles the outcome of sequential location in Tabuchi and
Thisse (1995), where the first-mover locates at the market centre and the follower locates
outside the market. In the subsequent section we will reconsider the case of sequential
location in the light of the present model.
4. Sequential location
In some markets it may be more realistic to assume that firms enter the marketsequentially, whereas bargaining and price competition remain simultaneous. In this13 In the context of labour input, this would correspond to a situation in which firm 1 is unionised (with a
monopoly union), whereas firm 2 is non-unionised.
particular extension of the model the game is now played in four stages. Firm 1 enters the
market first, followed by the locational choice of firm 2 in the second stage of the game. In
the third stage input prices are simultaneous determined through bargaining, whereas
output prices are set in the final stage of the game.
As before, the natural benchmark for comparison is the case of exogenous input prices.
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advantage, yielding x1 ¼ m12 ; x2 ¼ m32
 
as the equilibrium outcome.
Equilibrium locations when firms enter sequentially are derived by backwards
induction, starting at stage 2 of the game. The first-order condition for firm 2’s locational
choice yields a best-reply function
x2 ¼ R x1ð Þ: ð16Þ
At the first stage of the game firm 1 enters the market, anticipating the response of the
follower. Thus, the first-order condition for the optimal location of firm 1 is given by
Ap1 x1;R x1ð Þð Þ
Ax1
þ Ap1 x1;R x1ð Þð Þ
Ax2
dR
dx1
¼ 0: ð17Þ
Using the profit functions and the equilibrium expressions for input and output prices
derived in the previous section, the solution to the sequential game enables the following
statement:
Proposition 2. When firms enter the market sequentially, with firm 1 being the first
entrant, then
(i) firm 1 locates at the market centre if a1za2,
(ii) firm 1 locates away from the market centre if a1 < a2,
(iii) the firms always locate further apart than if production costs are exogenous.
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 illustrates that the outcome of the sequential game is potentially very
different from the case of exogenous production costs considered by Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995). If a1 < a2, the first-mover advantage is mitigated by the strategic disadvantage of
bargaining with a weak input supplier, causing the first entrant to locate away from the
market centre, with the follower locating closer to the market, making equilibrium
locations more symmetric around the market centre. In the extreme case of a1 ¼ 0 and
a2 ¼ 1, the follower will actually locate closer to the market centre than the first entrant,
with equilibrium locations given by xF1 ¼ 1; xF2 ¼ 1
 
.
In the opposite case, in which the first-mover also has the strategic advantage of
bargaining with the stronger input supplier, the first entrant clearly can do no better than
locating at the market centre, but the first-mover advantage is now reinforced in the sense
that the follower will locate even further away from the market, compared with the case of
exogenous production costs. The intuition follows straightforwardly from the analysis of
the previous section.
5. Welfare implications
With the assumptions of our model, an increase in input prices is a one-to-one monetary
transfer from downstream to upstream firms, and with unit demand and a non-binding
reservation price, an increase in output prices is similarly just a monetary transfer from
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sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus, is only determined by total outlays on
transportation costs. More precisely, maximising social welfare is equivalent to minimis-
ing consumers’ transportation costs.14 In this case we know, as demonstrated by Hotelling
(1929), that socially desirable locations require both firms to occupy symmetrical positions
at the quartiles of the market, i.e., x1 ¼ 14 and x2 ¼ 34.
Compared with exogenous production costs, it can easily be shown that the presence of
bilateral monopoly relations between input suppliers and downstream firms is always
detrimental to social welfare. This follows from Proposition 1, which shows that input
price bargaining induces the firms to locate further apart than in the case of exogenous
production costs, leading to higher transportation costs for the consumers. This is not an
immediately obvious result, though, since the more centrally located firm could potentially
be serving the majority of consumers. However, inserting equilibrium locations and prices
into (3), it is easily confirmed that the marginal consumer is always located at the market
centre. Thus, the downstream firm facing the stronger input supplier exploits this strategic
advantage by charging a relatively high price for the final product, always forcing half of
the consumer mass to ‘travel’ to the more distantly located firm, which charges a lower
price.
Considering the case of sequential entry to the market, input price bargaining could
result in a smaller total outlay on transportation costs, compared with the case of
exogenous production costs. If firm 1 is the first entrant, it is possible to show that the
existence of bilateral monopolies increases social welfare if both a1 and a2 are small, and
asymmetric in favour of a2. This is quite intuitive. When both input suppliers are weak, the
centrifugal effect of input price bargaining, which is detrimental to social welfare, is quite
small. If additionally the follower has the strategic advantage of bargaining with the
stronger input supplier, the first-mover advantage is partly mitigated, yielding more
symmetric equilibrium locations. When the distance between the firms is not too large,
this second effect will dominate, causing social welfare to increase.
6. Concluding remarks
In industries which are characterised by upstream market power, downstream firmshave potential incentives to act strategically in order to affect input prices, and thus14 Clearly, the assumption of unit demand has some rather strong implications for the analysis of social
welfare, making total transportation costs the only relevant variable. It should be said that although this
assumption may be a useful approximation for some markets, we would normally expect the ‘standard’ efficiency
loss from pricing above marginal costs to prevail. In this sense, the present welfare analysis is somewhat ‘partial’,and consequently the results should be interpreted with the necessary degree of care.
production costs. In the present paper we have analysed how bilateral monopoly relations
between upstream and downstream firms affect the choice of location (or product
differentiation) in the downstream market. Applying an ‘unconstrained’ Hotelling model
we have shown that the presence of input price bargaining induces the downstream firms
to locate further apart compared with the case of exogenous production costs. This means
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production costs, but rather to raise rival’s costs. We have also identified a strategic
advantage associated with facing a relatively strong upstream firm in bargaining, implying
that the firm facing the stronger input supplier has an incentive to relocate towards its rival,
while the rival has the opposite incentive.
Although one should be careful about putting too much emphasis on the welfare
implications of spatial competition models with unit demand, we are nevertheless able to
identify an additional, and hitherto unnoticed, inefficiency caused by upstream market
power. In addition to the familiar inefficiency caused by ‘double marginalisation’, we
show that the existence of bilateral monopolies also creates incentives for downstream
firms to relocate further away from the market centre, reinforcing the reduction-of-
competition effect that causes too much differentiation in the first place.
Finally, it should be noted that in order to facilitate analytical tractability when
extending the Hotelling model to incorporate bargaining on input prices, assumptions
regarding demand for the final product have been made as simple as possible, with
uniform distribution of consumers, unit demand and non-binding reservation prices. With
only two downstream firms this implies that the centrifugal forces in the model are very
strong, perhaps unrealistically strong. As mentioned in the Introduction, there are several
ways to incorporate stronger centripetal forces in the model. For instance, by making
demand more elastic one would get locations closer to the market centre. However, our
purpose has been to illustrate how the presence of input suppliers affects downstream
firms’ incentives to relocate, compared with the case of exogenous input prices, and these
(partial) effects should be robust to a number of modifications to the original model.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2(i)–(ii) Observe first that both firms occupying positions at the same side of the market
centre cannot be an equilibrium in the location game when consumers are symmetrically
distributed. If x* is the best response to x ¼ 1  D, then, due to symmetry, 1 x *must be2 1 2 2
the best response to x1 ¼ 12 þ D. It follows that pi 12  D; x2*
  ¼ pi 12 þ D; 1 x2*  for
i ¼ 1; 2. Thus, it suffices to consider locations where x1V 12Vx2 . Solving the first-order
condition for firm 2, we find this firm’s best response function to be given by
R x1ð Þ ¼ 1 8þ x1 2 a1ð Þ þ 2a1ð Þ : ðA:1Þ
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Inserting (A.1) into the profit function of firm 1 and taking the partial derivative with
respect to x1, we derive
Ap1 x1;R x1ð Þð Þ
Ax1
¼ W 4þ 4a1 þ a2a1  8a2  2x1 2 a2ð Þ 2 a1ð Þ
4 a1a2ð Þ2
; ðA:2Þ
where
W ¼ 4
81
t 20þ 2x1 2 a2ð Þ 2 a1ð Þ þ 8a2  4a1  7a2a1ð Þ:
Evaluating for x1V m12 VR x1ð Þ, a closer inspection of (A.2) reveals that Ap1=Ax1 > 0 if
a1 > a2. If a1Va2, then Ap1=Ax1 ¼ 0 for x1V m12 (with Ap1=Ax1 ¼ 0 for x1 ¼ m12 if a1 ¼ a2).
(iii) From (A.1) and (A.2), equilibrium locations are given by
xF1 ¼
4þ 4a1 þ a2a1  8a2
2 2 a1ð Þ 2 a2ð Þ if a1 < a2
1
2
if a1 z a2
8><
>>:
ðA:3Þ
xF2 ¼
12þ 4a1  8a2  a2a1
2 2 a2ð Þ 2 a1ð Þ if a1 < a2
6þ a1
2 2 a1ð Þ if a1 z a2
:
8><
>:
ðA:4Þ
Now define DuxF2  xF1 as the distance between the firms at equilibrium locations. From
(A.3) and (A.4) we find that D ¼ 4 a1a2 2 a2ð Þ 2 a1ð Þ= if a1 < a2 and D ¼
m2þ a1 2 a1= if a1za2. Clearly, D a1; a2ð Þ > D 0; 0ð Þ.
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